Abstract--This paper analyzes the relation between European natural gas storage facilities and price patterns at major trading points. Based on the theory of storage we derive testable hypothesis imposed by the non-arbitrage condition. Following the approach developed by [1], we use the risk adjusted basis as a proxy for inventory and test whether it is more variable during winter periods. Seasonal dummy variables are introduced to control for seasonalities in the convenience yield. The results indicate that while operators of storage facilities realize seasonal arbitrage profits the overall performance is substantially distinct from the competitive benchmark.
I. POINT OF INCEPTION
HE need for a competitive and efficient European natural gas market is clearly expressed in the draft of the next legislative package from the European Commission [2] . Whereas the past decade focused on the development of a level playing level field for operators mainly in (longdistance) transportation and LNG imports other parts of the value chain were moved back. The positive developments, as cumbersome as they may have been, are observable and pointing into a favorable direction.
Nevertheless, an integral part of the value added chain has 978-1-4244-1744-5/08/$25.00 © 2008 IEEE long been neglected. The EC acknowledges the importance of natural gas storage facilities in its new draft. In addition, the debate of securing energy supplies to Europe points out the fundamental importance of natural gas storage to counteract supply disruptions, balance the system and to provide additional flexibility. Evidence from the US, where a futures market at the NYMEX for inventories exist shows that the "old days" of being considered a backup inventory or seasonal supply source only are long foregone [3] . Approximately one third of total natural gas consumption in Europe is used for power generation [4] . Therefore, demand for natural gas in this sector and for heating by the residential sector is characterized by a strong seasonal pattern. Natural gas storage, next to flexible electricity dispatching and efficient balancing mechanism, provides capacities to cover seasonal peaks. If there exists liquid trading places for natural gas, traders should consider natural gas like any other commodity which would be released (injected) when spot market prices are high (low). Next to line-pack, storage provides additional flexibility required in a competitive market.
The current debate on the necessity and design of strategic storage for natural gas indicates another important aspect. Sufficient storage and import capacities need to be readily available to ensure security of supply. Therefore, the draft of the Third Directive [2] suggests independence of storage operators from other parts of the business and an increase in Theory of Storage -An Empirical Assessment of the European Natural Gas Market T transparency of available capacities to third parties. Nondiscriminatory access to storage facilities in connection with functioning market places will then contribute to the development of a truly competitive market. This paper departs here and investigates the current situation in the existing competitiveness of the market for natural gas storage in Europe. The starting point is the interdependency between natural gas spot and futures market prices and the use of storage. On the one hand, price signals will (given a competitive market environment) influence the operation of storage facilities. Also, experience from the US shows price signals being sufficient for infrastructure investments to come forward. On the other hand, development of natural gas storage capacities will reduce volatility of spot prices.
In a competitive environment the price of a storable commodity -like natural gas -should be explained by the non-arbitrage condition derived from the theory of storage. Theory predicts that the return from purchasing the commodity now and selling it for delivery at a later date equals the interest forgone storing the commodity plus marginal storage cost less marginal convenience yield from an additional unit of inventory. The convenience yield is the value from inventory and is negatively correlated with inventories, i.e. the higher the level of goods in store the less value is gained from storing one additional unit.
The aim of this paper is to investigate if the predictions of the theory of storage hold for the European natural gas market. We follow the approach developed by [1] using seasonal dummies instead of inventory data in order to capture variations in the marginal convenience yield. To distinguish between different regions we use market data for spot and futures prices from the British National Balance Point (NBP), from Zeebrugge (ZEE) (Belgium) and the Title Transfer Facility (TTF) in the Netherlands. We test the hypothesis that the basis varies with the nominal interest rates corresponding with the different maturities of the various futures contracts. Furthermore, we verify the existence between seasonals in the basis. If the hypotheses cannot be rejected, it follows that the European market for natural gas storage does currently not function in a purely merchant way.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the basic idea of the theory of storage accompanied by a brief literature overview of its empirical applications with a focus on natural gas. Section 3 describes the data before deducing testable hypotheses in Section 4. Here we also introduce the two indirect approaches chosen. Empirical results and their interpretation are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
II. LITERATURE OVERVIEW
Commodity price determination has been at the center for a long time. Increasing international trade and the development of global markets has brought this topic back on the agenda. The theory of storage [5] shows that filling quantities are determined by the equivalence of marginal storage cost and the intertemporal price spread a . In order to take into account for spot prices exceeding futures prices, [6] reformulates this approach and includes the convenience yield. Within the concept of convenience yields [7] consumers of a commodity receive an implicit stream of benefits from holding inventorythe convenience yield. The existence of such benefits can be ascribed to two different reasons. On the one hand, the convenience yield from holding inventories can arise because the stored product depicts an input for the production of other commodities. On the other hand, the benefit from storing could arise from the ability of a user to meet unexpected demand in the future. Both reasons are plausible when considering natural gas.
Natural gas is used to produce heat, very often together with electricity in combined heat and power stations. The demand for heat itself is very closely linked to the temperature, and the temperature itself is highly stochastic. This leads to the expectation that natural gas demand is also driven by temperature and should therefore follow similar stochastics. The theory of storage displays these dependencies. In essence it shows that commodity futures prices differ from spot prices by the cost of storage and interest costs of holding inventory, less convenience yield. Normalizing this relation to spot prices yields:
Let F(t,T) be the futures price at time t for delivery of the commodity at T and S(t) the spot price at t. The left hand side of equation (1) is the return from purchasing the commodity at t and selling it for delivery at a later date T, the so-called basis. The difference between futures and spot price should equal the interest foregone (r(t,T)) plus the marginal warehousing costs (W(t,T)), less the marginal convenience yield from an additional unit of inventory (C(t,T)). The value of marginal convenience yield should then decline as the aggregate level of inventory increases. It also shows that the slope is convex, an additional unit of inventory leads to a larger reduction in marginal convenience yield if the current level of inventory is low. In this context, [8] , [1] and [3] derive implications of a convex marginal convenience yield in terms of futures and spot price variances and correlations. They show that if the level of inventory is high, contemporaneous spot and forward prices should have similar variances and exhibit high correlation. Furthermore, it is shown that lower levels of inventory imply that the variance of spot prices exceeds the variance of future prices and leads, consequently, to a lower correlation between both prices. More recently, [10] , and [11] provide evidence for this theory showing that the convenience yield is inversely related to the a The intertemporal price spread is given by the difference in spot and futures prices. These findings are only valid as long as futures prices do not fall below spot prices, which cannot be assured when gas markets are considered.
b The marginal convenience yield is defined as the additional flow of benefits from holding an extra unit of inventory. level of inventory.
Concerning the application of the theory of storage to natural gas, most of the more recent empirical studies focus on the U.S. market. For example, [12] analyze the relationship between commodity price volatility and investment in storage facilities in the U.S. during a time period of major regulatory changes in market structure. A switching ARCH model with two states and two autoregressive terms show that an increase in volatility is followed by investments in additional storage facilities. Reference [13] also demonstrates the validity of the theory of storage. Here the basic connection between forward and spot prices is explained by using a bivariate GARCH model. Moreover, different risk premiums for the U.S. natural gas market are modeled and estimated. While the dependence of the upcoming convenience yields on other explanatory variables match economic theory, this does not hold for all resulting risk premiums. References [14] and [15] provide additional evidence on how commodity futures prices depend on inventory levels with a special focus on mean-reverting behavior for various U.S. commodity markets, including for natural gas. Whereas the predictions of the theory of storage are confirmed for the North American natural gas market between 1990 and 2002 by [16] , [17] find only partial support to the cost-of-carry theory of the basis determination. In a first application to the European market, [18] find similar results for the U.K. natural gas market with a non-linear effect of storage on the relationship between spot and futures prices. While [17] detect a negative risk premium for the U.S., the opposite holds for the U.K. as shown by [18] .
To the best of our knowledge our article is the first comparative analysis of major European trading points applying the theory of storage. We use the model of [1] as a starting point for our analysis. This is due to the fact that within the emerging European market for natural gas inventory data for storage facilities is hardly publicly available.
III. DATA We use daily data for spot and futures prices from the National Balancing Point in the UK (NBP), the Dutch Title Transfer Facility (TTF), and Zeebrugge in Belgium (ZEE), which is provided by Heren. The focus is on the analysis of the six and twelve month maturities of futures contracts. According to these two durations we use daily EURIBOR (for Belgium and the Netherlands) and LIBOR (for U.K.) rates from Bloomberg for 6-month and 1-year maturity to map the risk-free interest rate. c A futures contract is an agreement determining the delivery of a certain commodity at a pre-specified future date. Futures are marked to market, implying cash settlement at each trading day. Zeebrugge and NBP price data (p/Therm) is converted into €/MWh using daily exchange rates provided by Deutsche Bundesbank. 1 Therm equals 29.3071 kWh.
d A gas year starts at October, 1 st and is divided into winter (Oct.-Mar.) and summer seasons (Apr.-Sept.). Natural gas is usually withdrawn from storage during winter when demand and prices are high and injected during summer when supply exceeds the actual demand.
When were caused by shortages in production in Norwegian gas fields accompanied by relatively low temperatures across Europe (compared to the usual average).The second and third quarter of a year constitute the summer season of a "gas year".
The differences between futures price and spot price relative to spot price determine the spread (the left of eq. (1)) and is called basis. For further analysis we restrict our analysis on futures with six and twelve month maturities. Therefore, we calculate the different bases for the respective maturities. The following figures show the daily changes in price developments for the different trading points in order to enable a deeper understanding for the dependence of the different trading point. A further insight into the dependence of different trading points provides the Table 1 . Herein, the explanation content of the evolution in basis6 or basis12 for NBP for the development of the six or twelve month basis for TTF, respectively ZEE is highlighted.
Considering the coefficients and the R-squared it can easily be verified that ZEE is much more driven by NBP than TTF is likely to be. The following sections will provide evidence whether the European gas markets are efficient and furthermore, whether the theory of storage is valid for Europe.
IV. METHOD
Testing the performance of the European natural gas market with storage facilities as one of the main ingredients is based on the condition of an arbitrage-free market. The validity of equation (1) for the European gas market will be evaluated in two ways. Firstly, we use [9] and [16] to analyze how spot and futures prices behave in different states of storage activity. Secondly, based on [1] the overall market performance is assessed. Both approaches are of an indirect manner as neither requires inventory data.
A. Test of Pricing Behavior
Rearranging equation (1) implies that the left hand side stands for the interest adjusted basis and equals the difference of warehousing costs relative to spot prices and convenience yield relative to spot prices, such that:
With this the signs of the interest adjusted basis become predictors for the level of inventory. Low inventory implies a negative sign and vice versa. Furthermore, changes in spot and futures prices should be more or less of equal magnitude. Consequently, if the theory of storage holds, a low inventory level, i.e. a negative sign of the adjusted basis should imply higher variability in the adjusted basis.
B. Test of Overall Market Performance
To obtain an indirect test of the theory of storage without using inventory data, we follow [1] and use the following general regression formula:
where quarterly dummies Q i,t equal 1, if the corresponding futures contract matures in that period.
f The regression coefficients are given by β i , the residuals are modeled as an AR (1)-process. Using seasonal dummies in equation (3) is a rough way to control for seasonalities in the marginal convenience yield.
g We test two hypotheses: H1 (significance of predictors): The estimated coefficients β 2 and β 3 for the seasonal dummies should have significant explanatory power. High demand for natural gas in winter and low during summer creates arbitrage potential which will be e exploited by market participants as long as the market is efficient. H2 (market performance): The slope β 1 in the regression should vary one for one with the nominal interest rate (β 1 =1). Disregarding other conceivable reasons for market imperfections (e.g. market power on the wholesale level), a β 1 far away from one implies that storage users do not fully exploit arbitrage opportunities.
V. RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION
Results of test of significance of the predictors are shown in Table 2 reporting the number of observations, average values and volatilities of the risk adjusted basis for the individual considered trading points ordered by the sign of the risk adjusted basis.
Contrary to [16] who report a more or less equal share for the U.S., we observe a dominance of a positive adjusted basis at all hubs in Europe. This translates into a relatively low value (convenience yield) attached to natural gas in stocks by market participants indicating a higher level of inventory than required under pure economic operation of storage facilities. Standard deviations are larger when the interest-adjusted basis is positive, thereby contradicting economic reasoning.
f We have chosen quarterly dummies in order to map seasonality as they fit best. Q2,t and Q3,t represent the summer season of a gas year. E.g., Q2,t indicates that the futures contract matures during the second quarter of the year (April to June). The other two quarters are omitted in equation (3) and the remainder of the paper as they have no explanatory power. They are masked by Q2,t and Q3,t.
g In fact we control for W(t,T) -C(t,T).
Demand shocks in competitive markets of storable commodities create more independent variations of spot and futures prices leading to higher changes in the basis when inventory is low. In the European context, there are two conceivable explanations to this phenomenon. On the one hand, low convenience yield might indicate a higher level of inventory than required under pure economic operation of storage facilities. On the other hand, taking into account the limited availability of free storage capacities across Europe and the non-existent secondary market, participants with no access to storage facilities might just disregard this trading opportunity. If incumbents used their facility as a strategic mean, these players would attach a lower value to natural gas in stock than they would do under effective competition.
h Therefore, both observations give a first indication of a malfunctioning gas market in Europe.
Turning to the test of market performance we notice that data for all three trading points is explained best by the chosen model specification for the six month maturity of futures contracts (basis6) (Tables 3 and 4) . The best fit is achieved for Zeebrugge. Our model specification seems to provide a good approximation of the data compared to [1] who report goodness of fit of less than 20 % in many cases. Nonetheless, the relatively low values of R2 in some cases hint at important variables which have been omitted, i.e. storage levels. As soon as this information becomes publicly available, it should be integrated into the model and tested whether the results can be improved.
For all three European hubs, the interest rates are significant at a one percent level. The picture is less clear concerning seasonal dummies. The bases at the Dutch trading point show a much clearer seasonal pattern than NBP or ZEE. For basis6, the second quarter does not have significant h In this case, storage has a strategic rather than an operational value for its owner.
explanatory power. This is mainly due to the high volatility observed during winter season 2005/2006 masking the lowering effect of the first summer dummy. Given the seasonal influence at NBP and Zeebrugge, although lower than at TTF, our first hypothesis of the indirect performance test is confirmed. This indicates that storage facilities realize seasonal arbitrage but might reveal some problems when it comes to short term arbitrage. The negative signs of the dummy coefficients in the case of basis6 were expected as winter spot prices are compared with futures prices reflecting the market expectations of the next summer season. Since scarcity is usually higher during winter, the seasonal dummies tend to have a reducing effect on the basis. We also observe a negative sign of these coefficients in the case of basis12. Comparing scarcities of the same seasons, it is not immediately obvious why this should be the case. The lowering effect of the summer dummies on the basis indicatecompared to the winter cycle -a higher convenience yield during the second and third quarter of a year meaning lower stocks. Due to the arbitrage-free condition -assuming an unchanged interest rate -this leads to a convergence of spot and futures prices. The main result of the evaluation of the overall market performance is the magnitude of the interest rate coefficient which is far away from one, the value expected from theoretical considerations. At all hubs, we observe a β 1 of around 20 hinting at huge arbitrage potentials not exploited by market players. Therefore, the second hypothesis has to be rejected, indicating, again, a malfunctioning natural gas i It should be noted that we abstract from bottlenecks in the network. Nevertheless, a service-oriented operation of storage and the introduction of derivative products (virtual storage) should partly overcome these problems. storage market at the main three European trading points.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper contributes to the recent discussion on the role natural gas storage has to play in order to implement a competitive European market for natural gas. To assess the performance of natural gas storage, the observed market outcome has to be tested against a competitive benchmark, the intertemporal no-arbitrage condition. Our analysis is based on the indirect test of [1] and [9] . This allows us to analyze the performance of the three major European trading points in relation to storage with lacking inventory data. First we use the risk adjusted basis as a proxy for inventory testing whether the basis, i.e. the difference between futures and spot prices, is more variable during periods of low storage levels. Second, we introduce seasonal dummies to map storage levels controlling for seasonality in the convenience yield and for a one-for-one relation between the basis and risk-free interest rate. We find the results less intuitive and contradicting our expectations. Estimations using seasonal dummies led to interest rate coefficients far away from one. Surprisingly, though NBP is much more developed than the other two hubs, no significant differences across markets could be observed. Both indirect tests indicate a fairly high arbitrage potential not being exploited by market participants hinting at market imperfections. Given the limited availability of storage capacity and a missing secondary market for these products across Europe, the results could be explained by strategic behavior of storage owners. Also, this could be driven by lacking transparency. And finally, the market outcome might be influenced by the still dominant technical operation of storage facilities. In order to move towards the competitive benchmark this hurdles must be taken and is likely to lead to a more service-oriented operation of storage facilities. Further research is necessary in order to get a clearer picture on these issues, e.g. by incorporating direct information on storage levels as well as price data spanning longer time periods. So far, our analysis has dealt with a theoretical optimal usage of facilities neglecting other factors. In particular, availability of future natural gas supplies to Europe may substantially influence the relation in the forward-looking context.
